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| according to the textbook, the current world economy is increasingly becoming integrated and interdependent; as a result, the relationship between business and society is becoming more complex. In this assignment, you will be researching a Fortune 500 company from an approved company list provided by your professor. INSTRUCTIONS Write a 4–5 page evaluation of your chosen company’s performance with respect to its stated values. Do the following: Summarize the company’s primary products and or services. Suggest three ways in which the primary stakeholders can influence the organization’s financial performance. Provide support for your response. Describe two critical factors in the organization’s external environment that can affect its success. Support your assertions. Assess the company’s biggest success or missed opportunity to respond to a recent or current social issue. How did it impact company performance? Integrate at least two supporting resources from the Strayer University Library or other reputable sources. This course requires the use of Strayer Writing Standards. For assistance and information, refer to the Strayer Writing Standards link in the left-hand menu of your course. Check with your professor for any additional instructions.The specific course learning outcome associated with this assignment is: • Evaluate the relationship between a business and society based on external environmental factors, stakeholders, and corporate social responsibility issues. By submitting this paper, you agree: (1) that you are submitting your paper to be used and stored as part of the SafeAssign™ services in accordance with the Blackboard Privacy Policy ; (2) that your institution may use your paper in accordance with your institution’s policies; and (3) that your use of SafeAssign will be without recourse against Blackboard Inc. and its affiliates. Requirements: 4–5 pages_____ |
BUS475 SU Integrated Business Topics Tesla Company Analysis Essay
Suppose that three grocery stores sell Bubba’s Gourmet Red Beans
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| Suppose that three grocery stores sell Bubba’s Gourmet Red Beans and Rice. Bullseye market is able to acquire, stock, and market them for $2.00 per package. OKMart can acquire, stock, and market them for $1.98 per package. SamsMart can acquire, stock, and market them for $1.96 per package. a. If the three competitors are located in close proximity to one another, so that the cost of going to a different store to purchase red beans and rice is negligible, and if the market for prepackaged gourmet red beans and rice is characterized by Bertrand competition, what will the prevailing market price be? b. Where will customers buy their red beans and rice? Bullseye, OKMart, or SamsMart? What does your answer suggest about the potential rewards to small improvements in efficiency via cost-cutting? c. Suppose that each day, equal number of customers begin their shopping at each of the three stores. If the cost of going to a different store to purchase red beans and rice is 2 cents, is the Bertrand result likely to hold in this case? Where will customers purchase red beans and rice? Where will they not purchase them? |
Suppose that the inverse market demand for pumpkins is given
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| Suppose that the inverse market demand for pumpkins is given by P = $10 – 0.05Q. Pumpkins can be grown by anybody at a constant marginal cost of $1. a. If there are lots of pumpkin growers in town so that the pumpkin industry is competitive, how many pumpkins will be sold, and what price will they sell for? b. Suppose that a freak weather event wipes out the pumpkins of all but two producers, Linus and Lucy. Both Linus and Lucy have produced bumper crops, and have more than enough pumpkins available to satisfy the demand at even a zero price. If Linus and Lucy collude to generate monopoly profits, how many pumpkins will they sell, and what price will they sell for? c. Suppose that the predominant form of competition in the pumpkin industry is price competition. In other words, suppose that Linus and Lucy are Bertrand competitors. What will be the final price of pumpkins in this market – in other words, what is the Bertrand equilibrium price? d. At the Bertrand equilibrium price, what will be the final quantity of pumpkins sold by both Linus and Lucy individually, and for the industry as a whole? How profitable will Linus and Lucy be? e. Would the results you found in parts (c) and (d) be likely to hold if Linus let it be known that his pumpkins were the most orange in town, and Lucy let it be known that hers were the tastiest? Explain. |
Suppose in the previous problem that Gaston can produce soufflés
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| Suppose in the previous problem that Gaston can produce soufflés at a constant marginal cost of $5, but Pierre produces soufflés for $7. Together, they collude to produce three units each. a. How much profit will each producer earn? What will be the total profit of the cartel? b. Gaston observes that he is a more efficient producer than Pierre, and suggests that if they are going to produce six units, the cartel’s interests are better served if Gaston produces all of the soufflés. i. If Gaston produces and sells all of the soufflés and Pierre produces nothing, what happens to the profit of the cartel? ii. Is Pierre likely to agree not to produce any soufflés? iii. Suppose Gaston offers to pay Pierre not to produce any soufflés. How much would Gaston potentially be willing to offer? What is the minimum offer that Pierre should accept? iv. Suppose that the deal in part (iii) is reached for Pierre’s minimum price. What happens to Pierre’s profit if he cheats on his agreement with Gaston and increases his output from zero soufflés to one? What happens to Gaston’s profit? v. Compare Pierre’s incentive to cheat under this arrangement with the incentive that exists when they split production equally. Also compare Gaston’s vulnerability to Pierre’s cheating under both arrangements. Why might this cartel choose to use the less-profitable method of each member producing three units to the potentially more-profitable method of having Gaston produce everything? |
When competition between firms is based on quantities (Cournot competition),
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| When competition between firms is based on quantities (Cournot competition), the reaction functions we derive tell us that when Firm A increases its output, Firm B’s best response is to cut its own. However, when competition between firms is based on price (Bertrand competition), reaction functions tell us that Firm B’s response to a cut in Firm A’s price (which will lead to an increase in the quantity A sells) should be a corresponding cut in B’s price (and a corresponding increase in its own output). Reconcile these two results. |
Consider a monopolistically competitive industry. A graph of demand and
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| a. Is this firm generating producer surplus? Is this firm earning a profit? How can you reconcile your answers? b. Do you expect any entry into or exit from this industry to occur? Explain. c. Suppose that the government reduces annual licensing fees, causing the fixed cost of the typical firm to fall. Make appropriate shifts of all curves that might be affected. What happens to producer surplus? What happens to profit? Do you expect the fall in fixed costs to cause entry into or exit from this industry? Explain. d. Shift the demand and marginal revenue curves to reflect the entry/exit you indicated in (c). Find the new equilibrium. e. Continue to reduce fixed cost. What happens to the demand curve as fixed cost continues to fall? What happens to producer surplus and profit? f. Find the equilibrium as fixed cost falls to zero. |
Owners of a movie theater have determined that the elasticity
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| Owners of a movie theater have determined that the elasticity of demand for movie tickets equals -2.0 for students and -1.5 for adults. a. If the owners of the theater decide to segment the market, who should be charged a higher price, students or adults? Use your knowledge of microeconomic theory to explain why. b. Use the Lerner index as described in the text to determine the ratio of prices. In percentage terms, how big a price premium should be charged to the group that pays the higher price? |
In Problem 5, you found the profit that a promoter
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| In Problem 5, you found the profit that a promoter of a major college basketball tournament would earn if he were to segment the market into adults and students. Suppose that the promoter’s CEO decides that price discrimination presents a poor public image, and announces that everybody will be charged the same price. His resident economist (you) is tasked with figuring out what that price should be. a. Find the total demand for tickets by adding the demand curves of adults and students. b. Derive the inverse demand curve for tickets, as well as the associated marginal revenue curve associated with that demand. c. Find the profit-maximizing quantity of tickets and the corresponding price. d. Determine the promoter’s profit. e. Compare the promoter’s profit when he tries to price for the entire market, to his profit when he simply charges the adult price from the previous problem. Is it better for the promoter to price for the entire market and almost fill the arena, or to price for adults only and have a lot of empty seats? |
Promoters of a major college basketball tournament estimate that the
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| Promoters of a major college basketball tournament estimate that the demand for tickets on the part of adults is given by Qad = 5,000 – 10P, and that the demand for tickets on the part of students is given by Qst = 10,000 – 100P. The promoters wish to segment the market and charge adults and students different prices. They estimate that the marginal and average total cost of seating an additional spectator is constant at $10. a. For each segment (adults and students), find the inverse demand and marginal revenue functions. b. Equate marginal revenue and marginal cost. Determine the profit-maximizing quantity for each segment. c. Plug the quantities you found in (b) into the respective inverse demand curves to find the profit maximizing price for each segment. Who pays more, adults or students? d. Determine the profit generated by each segment, and add them together to find the promoter’s total profit. e. How would your answers change if the arena where the event was to take place had only 5,000 seats? |
Consider the problem faced by the Butterfinger seller in Problem
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| Consider the problem faced by the Butterfinger seller in Problem 3. a. Assume that the seller is able to prevent resale between customers. In the real world, why is the seller still unlikely to be able to perfectly price discriminate? b. Because of the reason you just indicated, the Butterfinger seller decides to segment her customers into two groups, each of which will be charged a different price. In order to maximize profit, should the seller sort by gender or by age? c. Based on your answer to (b), determine who is in each group, and indicate (1) the price the seller should set for each group, (2) the total profit received by the seller, (3) total consumer surplus, and (4) the deadweight loss. d. Is this pricing strategy (segmenting) more profitable to the seller than perfectly price discriminating? Is this pricing strategy more profitable than charging every consumer the same price? e. What happens to consumer surplus and deadweight loss when a single-price monopolist begins segmenting in this way? |
