dilemma decision, both managers can make credible threats to punish cheatin… Show more In a repeated prisoners’ dilemma decision, both managers can make credible threats to punish cheating because a. if either manager cheats, the other manager can increase its profit by also cheating. b. both of the cheating cells in the payoff table are strategically stable cells. c. when both firms cheat, they both avoid the Nash equilibrium cell. d. both a and c. 33 Price matching is a strategic move that seeks to make cheating unprofitable. must generally be announced publicly in order to have the desired effect. has no usefulness to managers if a simultaneous pricing decision is going to be made only one time. both a and b all of the above 34 Price matching is a strategic commitment. is a flexible pledge to match any lower prices offered by rivals. must be irreversible in order to have the desired effect. both a and c. both b and c • Show less