In each of the three games shown below, let p be the probability that player 1 plays cooperates (and… Show more In each of the three games shown below, let p be the probability that player 1 plays cooperates (and 1- p the probability that player 1 defects), and let q be the probability that Player 2 plays cooperates (and 1- q the probability that player 2 defects). PrisonerÃ¢â‚¬â„¢s Dilemma Player 2 Player 2 Player 2 Player 1 cooperate defect Player 1 cooperate 70,70 10,80 Player 1 defect 80,10 40,40 Stag Hunt Player 2 Player 2 Player 2 Player 1 cooperate defect Player 1 cooperate 70,70 5,40 Player 1 defect 40,5 40,40 Chicken Player 2 Player 2 Player 2 Player 1 cooperate defect Player 1 cooperate 70,70 50,80 Player 1 defect 80,50 40,40 1. For each game, draw a graph with player 1Ã¢â‚¬â„¢s best response function (choice of p as a function of q), and player 2Ã¢â‚¬â„¢s best response function (choice of q as a function of p), with p on the horizontal axis and q on the vertical axis. 2. Using this graphs, find all the Nash equilibriums for the game, both pure and mixed strategy Nash equilibriums (if any). Label these equilibriums on the corresponding graph. 3. In those games that have multiple pure strategy Nash equilibriums, how do the expected payoffs from playing the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium compare with the payoffs from playing the pure strategy Nash equilibriums? Which type of strategy (mixed or pure) would players prefer to play in these games? • Show less